TY - JOUR AU - Dixon, Jonathan PY - 2020/09/30 Y2 - 2024/03/28 TI - Reliable Knowledge: A Reply to Turri JF - Dialectica JA - Dialectica VL - 74 IS - 3 SE - Articles DO - 10.48106/dial.v74.i3.03 UR - https://dialectica.philosophie.ch/dialectica/article/view/23 SP - 495–508 AB - <p>Recently John Turri (2015b) has argued, contra the orthodoxy amongst epistemologists, that reliability is not a necessary condition for knowledge. From this result, Turri (2015a, 2017, 2016a, 2019) defends a new account of knowledge—called abilism—that allows for unreliable knowledge. I argue that Turri’s arguments fail to establish that unreliable knowledge is possible and argue that Turri’s account of knowledge is false because reliability must be a necessary condition for knowledge.</p> ER -